



# **Examiners' Report** **June 2023**

**GCE History 9HI0 2E**

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## Introduction

Once again, candidates from across the ability range were able to engage effectively with the A Level paper 2E which deals with Mao's China, 1949-76 (2E.1) and The German Democratic Republic, 1949-90 (2E.2).

The paper is divided into two sections. Section A contains a compulsory question which is based on two linked sources. It assesses source analysis and evaluation skills (AO2). Section B comprises a choice of essays that assess understanding of the period in depth (AO1) by targeting five second order concepts – cause, consequence, change and continuity, similarity and difference, and significance.

Candidates appeared to organise their time effectively and there was little evidence of candidates being unable to attempt both answers within the time allocated.

Significantly, examiners continue to note that a number of scripts posed some problems with the legibility of handwriting. This appears to have become more marked this year. Candidates are reminded that examiners can only give credit for what they can read. Similarly, examiners have remarked on the increasing use of shorthand and abbreviations in candidates' answers, which often hinder meaning and spoil the flow of an argument.

In Section A, the strongest answers were able to develop reasoned and supported inferences from the content of the sources and to evaluate the sources thoroughly in relation to the demands of the enquiry based on both the contextual knowledge displayed and an awareness of the nature, origin and purpose of the sources. It is important that candidates should be clear that weight is not likely to be established by a discussion of what is missing from a source. If the author of the source has omitted something intentionally in order to modify meaning or distort the message of the sources, then it will be relevant to discuss that omission in reaching a conclusion regarding the use that a historian might make of the sources. However, comments on all the things that the sources might have contained but failed to do so is unlikely to contribute to establishing weight. The question requires candidates to use the sources 'together' and most candidates continue to be aware of this requirement. It can be achieved using a variety of different approaches.

In section B it was clear that most candidates had a secure knowledge base, but this was not always effectively used to address the specific focus of the questions posed. Stronger answers clearly understood the importance of identifying the appropriate second order concept that was being targeted by the question. Candidates need to be aware of the chronological parameters of questions and to ensure that they write across the chronology, not merely using the start and end dates as bookends with little consideration of the events between. Not all candidates have a secure understanding of what is meant by 'criteria' in terms of bullet point 3 of the mark scheme. Some candidates explicitly state in the introduction to the essay that they are naming the criteria that they plan to use, when in fact they are referring to the issues or the factors that will be discussed in the response. 'Criteria' in bullet point 3 of the mark scheme refers to the basis on which candidates reach their judgement, not the issues that are discussed in the process of reaching that judgement.

## Question 1

Responses to this question came from across the ability range but there were many strong answers. These were able to develop inferences from both sources and added to these with impressive contextual knowledge. Many noted that the sources suggested a number of different methods that the CCP used to establish control in the early years of its rule, notably the identification of potential counterrevolutionaries, the incitement of the wider community against them, and the uses made of intimidation and violence. These were often discussed with reference to the CCP's Three and Five Antis campaigns. In considering the weight that the evidence of the sources could bear in relation to the enquiry, the stronger candidates frequently made valid comments on the uses of Source 1 in particular.

Weaker answers tended not to engage fully with the content of the sources, a problem caused by rushed reading perhaps but one which stymied candidates' ability to engage with the enquiry. Many wrote extensively about the nature, origin and purpose of the sources, often along stereotypical lines, without attempting to apply this to the content of the sources in coming to a judgement. A significant minority of candidates did not consider the utility of the sources at all.

Source 1 discusses the role that a police system played in helping consolidate control in early CCP years. The ex-policeman states how they focused on "detaining counter-revolutionaries" who made up 9/10 prisoners in the Laogai system. He also mentions how they had "different categories to investigate" including landlords and spies, to which they gathered intel on suspects through reports or family members. The source also mentioned how "things were chaotic" due to some policemen making false arrests. These details are very important, as they are able to inform an historian on how the CCP managed to consolidate control in their early years, by exposing the method of police gathering intel on suspects before being detained. It paints a very solemn image, suggesting there was no unnecessary violence or terror, and that the public were very willing to help. Perhaps this source is useful due to it being written by someone who had knowledge of this and played the same role throughout Mao's era.

Source 2 makes reference to the 3 anti's "corruption, waste, and bureaucracy", as well as the 5 anti's "bribery, tax evasion etc...". It discusses how these policies/

programme will help the party have a "united front" putting "the state ... in a strong position". The 3 and 5 Antis (1951-2) attempted to ~~the~~ eradicate members of the party who were said to be too close to capitalists as well as anyone in society who was found to have done one or more of the antis. Source 2 is successfully able to show how the CCP used policies to assert their control, by removal of opponents. The source, just like source 1, mentions how the state will use punishments like "fines, confiscation, arrest, imprisonment, or execution" against those found guilty of one or more of these crimes. Together the sources are able to tell a historian about methods the CCP used in early years to consolidate control, including policing which led to arrests and imprisonment, and policies like 3 and 5 Antis which had a variety of punishments for those caught.

However both sources fail to mention the use of violence and terror, that the CCP used in the form of the Great ~~Terror~~ Purge (1950-1) and reunification ~~anti~~ campaigns (1949-51), in order to ~~consolidate~~ establish control. ~~The Great Purge saw up to 5 million people die~~. The reunification campaigns of 1949-51, saw the PLA establish control in Tibet (1950) forcefully, in Xinjiang (1951) purging many Uyghur Muslims and in Guangdong which was home to the CMO. These ~~are~~ are 2 other important

methods that the CCP used to establish control. Perhaps source 1 is limited in this way due to it being an interview of one of <sup>ex-</sup> police officers, who may not have knowledge of these or have even taken part in them. Therefore the contents of source 1 can be said to be limited due to the nature of it. However source 1 is written after Mao's time, but uses an ex-officer who served during Mao's whole era, which can be useful because there are no worries of persecution (not Maoist era) meaning answers are more likely to be valid and comes from someone who has first hand experience.

Source 2 could be viewed as limited due to its origin - being a CCP directive that informs us on the 3 and 5 anti's. This is limiting as there is no other mention of alternative methods; due to its purpose to tell cadres how/who to arrest based on the new 5 anti campaign. However it can be viewed as useful in telling an historian about what methods the CCP used in early years, as it comes directly from the party meaning it is official.

~~At the~~ All in all, a historian can make great use of sources 1 and 2 in telling them what methods the CCP used to establish control in their early years, including policing and intel, as well as the 5 anti and its punishments. However there is some limitation, in terms of other methods that were used being left out.

like terror or forced PLA presences, in order to establish control.



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This answer makes inferences from both sources with regard to the methods used by the CCP to establish control in China, though these are not developed very far. To this the candidate adds some contextual knowledge to expand the points being made. Finally, a valid attempt is made to assess the utility of the sources to the enquiry by use of the candidate's own knowledge. It was awarded a top L3 mark.

## Question 2

In this question, the better answers clearly identified the seeming enthusiasm for closer relations between the FRG and GDR displayed in Source 3 and used their contextual knowledge to consider the differences implied by Brandt's enthusiasm for Ostpolitik in comparison to those Chancellors that had upheld the Hallstein Doctrine. In Source 4, many drew inferences that suggested that the GDR was considerably more wary of the FRG's motives, while speculating that Stoph's speech was probably designed with the reaction of the GDR's communist neighbours in mind.

Weaker answers tended not to engage fully with the content of the sources, a problem caused by rushed reading perhaps but one which stymied candidates' ability to engage with the enquiry. Many wrote extensively about the nature, origin and purpose of the sources often along stereotypical lines without attempting to apply this to the content of the sources in coming to a judgement. A significant minority of candidates lacked any engagement with the utility of the sources and/or included knowledge that was tangential to the focus of the question, that is, relations between the FRG and GDR in 1970.

Sources 3 and 4 provide a useful insight into the relations between the GDR and the FRG in 1970 as they are from two different points of view, one from West German Chancellor Willy Brandt and the other from Willi Stoph the Chairman of the Ministerial Council in the GDR, this gives us a comprehensive view of the relations. However, Source 3's utility in particular is reduced due to the purpose of the source - a letter <sup>with the intention of</sup> ~~in order to form~~ ~~dipl~~ persuading Willi Stoph to ~~come~~ form a positive diplomatic relationship ~~with~~ between the two Germanys - thus it may not represent the true regard of West German Politicians to East Germany at this time.

Source 3 gives a useful insight behind what was the aims of Willy Brandt in his policy of Ostpolitik which started in 1969 when he became Chancellor ~~after~~ Konrad Adenauer. Source 3 suggests that there was a keen desire in the FRG for improved relations between the two German states - Brandt

shows his desire for negotiations between the two states to be ~~not use~~ decided through diplomatic negotiations rather than force. This may <sup>is</sup> ~~have~~ <sup>plausible</sup> ~~been~~ <sup>as there was</sup> ~~as a result of~~ the increasing detente period during this time, in which diplomatic negotiations were desirable, thus ~~then~~ Brandt discusses that he wished to settle the 'legal issue of our equality as states' referring to the fact that before 1969 Konrad Adenauer had followed the Hallstein doctrine in which the FRG did not recognise the GDR as a separate state ~~but~~ instead referred to it as the eastern 'zone' in the hopes that, in not legitimising the GDR's existence, it may promote reunification. It is widely known that Willy Brandt's policy of Ostpolitik was largely different in the sense that he believed that in increasing connections between the two states it may bring about reunification in the long term through undermining ~~the~~ GDR attempts to separate the two states, therefore the source is ~~accurate~~ <sup>useful</sup> in the sense that it accurately depicts how Brandt planned to fulfil Ostpolitik. Source 3 also ~~is~~ includes Brandt's statement that he would like to make 'life easier for people in a divided Germany'. This statement

Shows that it was Brandt's intention to increase connections between the two states, such as the ~~allowing~~<sup>allowance</sup> of West Berliners to visit east Berlin where 6 million traveled in to the GDR in 1973, for the 'people'. Whilst ~~that~~ there may be some truth in that this - that socially the policy of Ostpolitik was largely positive for the people, ~~there~~ the source misses the fact that the policy of interdependence and interconnectiveness came from the primary aim - as discussed - to in the long term promote reunification. However, that being said Brandt does say that Willi Stoph should contact the Minister for Intra-german Affairs to continue negotiations. ~~suggesting th~~ This is important as it was known that in 1970 the GDR dealt with the FRG through their Ministry of International Affairs suggesting that through using 'inter-german' ministry that the FRG still viewed the GDR ~~as~~ not as a separate country. The lack of overt non acknowledgement of the GDR as a separate state ~~perhaps~~ is perhaps due to the fact that the letter is addressed to Willi Stoph with the purpose of convincing the GDR gov that the FRG desired for a genuine recog

reunion of the two countries, thus leading to a more positive depiction of the FRG - GDR relationship as cooperative.

However, in Source 4 <sup>said</sup> written by Willi Stoph to the GDR Volkskammer, the note that the FRG were less open ~~and~~ to the GDR as overtly stated is echoed when he remarks that 'even now, a policy of vindictiveness towards' the GDR exists so they had to 'be alert'. This is an accurate depiction of cautiousness by the GDR to the western policy of Ostpolitik as there is evidence that the policy was not overly taken as a success by the SED government - for example following the restrictions on travel being partially lifted, there were efforts to reduce the effect of the restrictions for example, the amount FRG citizens had to transfer in currency to visit the GDR was doubled in 1973 reducing visitors by 1/3rd. Stoph also says that, despite this, the 'Council of State saw the Erfurt meeting useful' suggesting that ~~there was an~~ the GDR saw the Ostpolitik reforms in 1970 as positive as well. This is true to the extent

that closer relations with the FRG were highly beneficial to the GDR in the 1970s as it supported ~~the~~ economic policies, such as Honecker's Unity of Social and Economic Policy, through the availability of cheap credit. The account by Stoph is likely more ~~reliable~~ useful in gauging the relationship between the FRG and the GDR as it depicts that there was a level of distrust still present after the meetings in 1970. This is as Stoph's speech is less subject to manipulation than Brandt's as it is being delivered directly to the GDR Volkskammer and therefore there is less need to cover up real intentions like Stoph's.

In conclusion, ~~the~~ using both sources 3 and 4 it can be concluded that there was a growing positive relationship between the FRG and the GDR in 1970. However, further analysis of the nature and purpose of the sources suggest that there may be aspects to the relationship left unsaid, particularly within Brandt's letter. ~~and~~ However, when taken into account, this bias can be

*reasoned giving a useful insight into the relationship between the GDR and FRG.*



Here, the candidate makes reasoned inferences from both sources in relation to relations between the FRG and GDR in 1970. Contextual knowledge is added that illuminates the source content and some attempt is made to address the utility of the sources to the enquiry, though this could have been developed further. It was given a high L4 mark.

### Question 3

This was a popular essay question, and it was often done very well. Many candidates had extensive and detailed knowledge of those that challenged Mao's personal power in the years specified. Having considered the challenges to Mao before the Cultural Revolution, by Peng Dehuai for example, and that of Lin Biao during it, most concluded that Mao's position was never seriously threatened. Others argued that the presence of Deng and Zhou Enlai at both ends of the period, and the power throughout of the PLA, might suggest otherwise.

Many weaker answers lacked range and depth of knowledge, and their answers were often imprecise and lacking accuracy. Judgements tended to assertion without being supported by the evidence presented.

PLAN: → GLF, great power bad policies '58-'62 (intro)  
→ Lin + Deng '62-'65 running more right (1)  
→ CR, Lin Biao, Gang of Four - '71 always struggle  
→ 71-'76 Zhou Enlai, Deng, declassified "tiger monkey" / left/right

During the years of 1957 - 1976, Mao was always seen as the Supreme Leader of the CPC; however, his power over the party was never absolute, as there was a constant factionalising and in-fighting. Mao himself called it the struggle between tigers and monkeys, with tigers representing potentially more right-wing top-down elements of the party and monkeys being the bottom-up radical leftist side. In order to weigh the extent of which Mao's personal power was challenged specifically by other leading party members, it's important to look at the roles of Lin and Deng from the GLF and it's aftermath, Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and the Gang of Four during 1962-71 and the restoration of Deng and added Zhou Enlai between the years 1971-'76. When analysing

all these leaders, one could argue that Mao's personal power was constantly challenged; however, especially much during the years 1971-'76.

Starting off from 1957, while Mao had opposition within the party, there wasn't yet any huge challenging leader. The power of Mao was first undermined due to the consequences of the GLF. When Mao saw the USSR send Sputnik to space and rising tensions between the two countries, he decided that China had to rapidly catch up and launched the GLF, which lasted from 1958-'62. As that policy was a great failure both economically and for undermining Mao's position, he decided to first take a step back from actively leading the party after Peng had attempted to challenge Mao in the Lushan conference of 1959 - while Peng's challenge itself was unsuccessful, Mao soon had to realize that GLF had put him in a bad position he didn't know how to fix, forcing him to temporarily take a step back from the leading position of the

party. While no one from the CPC was really able to successfully challenge Mao in the years of 1957-'62, the failures of his own policies led to him giving away personal power in 1962.

From there it was picked up by Deng and Lin, that had greatly challenged Mao's position in the party between the years of 1962-'65. However, as Mao had somewhat voluntarily taken a step back, these challenges were arguably not the most significant for Mao's power. Nevertheless, Deng and Lin represented a more right-wing "tiger" economic side, which Mao greatly disagreed with. Their reforms that partially privatised China's economy and increased party bureaucracy were seen by Mao as a betrayal of the Revolution, and while Deng and Lin might not have challenged Mao's public image as much, the policy changes were seen by Mao as catastrophic. Once Mao saw how far they had went by 1965, he realized he didn't even have the political capability of properly reversing these policies

by himself without making it look like a coup, showing the extent to which Mao's power was economically challenged. However, it wasn't the most significant extent of influence by other party members, as the masses were still then on Mao's side, who he was then able to use from 1966 to push out both Lin and Deng.

During the earlier years of Cultural Revolution, from 1966-1971, as Mao had given and called for more power from the "monkeys" or left-wing faction, the party members representing even more radical sides of that can be seen as Mao's greatest challengers. Namely Mao's own 4th wife Jiang Qing, that had been given the control over arts and culture and her Gang of Four, who all supported even more violent sides of the CR than Mao himself did. Although Mao agreed with them, political radical camp, at the need to get rid of capitalist roads, Mao felt like their attacks were a little too brutal, especially in the years of 1968-'71 in which gang of four controlled

attacks on counter-revolutionaries, for which Mao would've preferred more verbal struggles but didn't have full control over. Furthermore, during these years Mao's power was also arguably challenged by the radical military camp, which was led by Lin Biao. Although Mao didn't view Lin as a challenger to his power at first, as he had declared Lin to be his successor in the 9th Party Congress, Lin arguably made the most radical attempt at challenging Mao's power by plotting his murder and getting exposed doing so in 1971. This arguably was a turning point for Mao's control, as he hadn't expected the attack. However, it failed and Lin died in a plane crash while trying to escape. Before the assassination attempt and from the start of the Cultural Revolution from 1966-'71, Mao's greatest challengers in the party were the radical political camp led by Jiang and slightly radical military camp led by Lin. Although Mao didn't agree with all of their policies, the challenge can't be seen as the most important or widespread, as Mao generally agreed with their ideas to get rid of right-wing elements, even if their preferred methods differed.

The greatest challenge to Mao's power happened between the years of 1971-1976 by Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai, as by that time Mao was still shocked by the assassination attempt and didn't make any large efforts to lead the country anymore. Once Mao found out his designed successor was a traitor, he was sent into a crisis mode and forced to invite some previously exiled party members back into positions of power, as he was uncertain on how far-reaching the conspiracy could've been. Once he appointed Zhou Enlai to second in command, ~~he~~<sup>Zhou</sup> soon also invited back Deng. Both of them had represented the more top-down approach, which Mao had seen fail in the USSR and been trying hard to fight. However, as Mao felt he couldn't trust the bottom-up representatives in the party anymore, he had no choice but to accept being vastly undermined by policies that were getting back to more and more bureaucratic and capitalist ideals and only continued to the right after Mao's death. The challenge between 1971-1976 can be

seen as the most wide-reaching one, as compared to previous obstacles, the masses were also disillusioned by Mao after the hectic years of the Cultural Revolution, thus CPC was almost fully out of Mao's control by 1976, even if he still by name remained as their Supreme Leader.

Within the Communist Party of China, Mao was mainly challenged by two opposing factions: the more left-wing side, which got the most power over Mao and the party between the years of 1966-'71 but fundamentally still answered to Mao's ideals; and the more right-wing one which, after being mostly unchallenged from 1957-'62 had the most influence over policies during the recovery from the Great Leap Forward, but were able to overtake Mao's control of the party in everything but name from 1971, after Mao had been left betrayed by Lin Biao's assassination attempt, and got Deng to take China down the revisionist road, one of which had been Mao's main goal of fighting to keep away from gaining power.



This L5 response sustains an analytical focus on challenges to Mao in the period specified. It deploys sufficient knowledge to respond to the demands of the question in full. The argument is logical and coherent throughout, and valid criteria are established and applied in coming to a judgement.

## Question 4

Though the less popular of the two essay questions, there was a range of responses to it from across the ability range. Some very good answers had an impressive knowledge of the Cultural Revolution its success or otherwise, in eradicating the 'four olds'. These were able to assess convincingly the extent and the permanence of the attacks orchestrated by Mao on traditional customs and works of art, for example. Many pointed out that the attack of the 'four olds' lasted for a relatively short period of time and that its impact varied throughout China.

Weaker candidates knew something of the Cultural Revolution though it was often patchy and imprecise. This often stymied the chances of making a convincing and reasoned judgement.

The cultural revolution had moderate success in eradicating the four olds from Chinese society but I disagree that it had great success. During the cultural revolution, things which were seen as one of the four olds were destroyed, along with things such as church, religion, anything to do with religion, for example anything seen as buddhist was destroyed in Tibet. So ~~whole~~ objects that were seen as part of the 4 olds were destroyed on a massive scale, but the cultural revolution was ~~far less~~ ~~so~~ not did have great success in eradicating the 4 olds from Chinese society because many things ~~in the~~ that were considered as part of the 4 olds (old ideas, old custom, old culture, and old habits) were too deeply engrained to be completely eradicated. For example ~~Mao~~ <sup>the Cul</sup> was ~~unsuccessful~~ at the Cultural Revolution was unsuccessful at eradicating ~~confucian~~ Confucian practices from Chinese society because it had been

practised for 2,500 years and was too deeply ingrained to be completely eradicated. The cultural revolution was also unsuccessful in eradicating what they claimed was worshipping the dead (elaborate funeral rituals) which was considered to be an old custom. However, it is clear that the ~~cultural~~ <sup>cultural</sup> revolution failed by the number of people who ~~are~~ <sup>publicly</sup> mourned at the death of popular communist Enlai. But by using extreme violence such as executions, as well as ~~supp~~ <sup>suspecting</sup> many people especially teachers and academics to death or struggle sessions the cultural revolution did manage to successfully ~~eradicating~~ ~~eradicating~~ people stop people educating children about what had been destroyed. ~~Especially~~ as ~~meaning~~ they the ~~success~~ cultural revolution successfully ~~eradicating~~ ~~eradicating~~ knowledge ~~on~~ ~~or~~ of many of the 4 olds, particularly religion for example any remains of Christianity was eradicated which is evident because even decades after the cultural revolution there is still very few Christians in China. Meaning

that the cultural revolution was very successful at eradicating ~~China~~ Christianity. The cultural revolution was also ~~so~~ ~~very~~ successful at eradicating the reputation of and ~~as~~ memory of previous Chinese heroes. For example middle school children destroyed the remains of a Chinese war hero and the show of children destroying the bones of someone who had been previously been a hero made people so afraid they were far more likely to only talk and teach their teacher children about ~~these~~ communist heroes who were decided or seen as heroes by the state meaning the cultural revolution was successful at eradicating the teachings of people who had been seen as heroes, because people were afraid of being subjected to violent struggles struggle session or executions or being sent to the Laozi - which was the Chinese equivalent to the gulag. Schools were also closed for 2 years during the cultural ~~successful~~ revolution ~~me~~ and by the ~~time~~ meaning many children became further indoctrinated ~~into~~ indoctrinated by Communism and went on to reject the Four olds

meaning the 4 olds were ~~not~~ more successfully eradicated by the younger generation of Chinese. In conclusion the cultural revolution was mostly successful after it destroyed almost the 4 olds however it failed to destroy Confucian ideas practices such as ~~celebra~~ respect to your elders and ~~destruction~~. After Mao's death ~~or~~ some of the 4 olds ~~also~~ also crept back into Chinese society such as shoumen and the celebrations of certain festivals.



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This response provides some analysis of relevant key features of the question with regard to the success of the Cultural Revolution in eradicating the 'four olds'. Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is provided though it lacks depth. Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement, but the answer is weakly substantiated. It was given a high L3 mark.

## Question 5

The best answers to this question were able to evidence, in some depth, both Khrushchev's part in the construction of the Berlin Wall, and the other factors that led to its erection, notably the continual drain of talent to the West. Such responses considered fully, Khrushchev's attempts to settle the question of Berlin with the western powers in the years leading up to August 1961, and considered the likelihood of Ulbricht being able to go ahead with the Wall without the full support of the leader of the USSR.

The weaker responses tended to know little of Khrushchev's role though were comfortable evidencing the emigration crisis and/or the economic reasons for building the Wall. Some candidates lacked a sufficient knowledge of the period to be able to answer the question convincingly.

On the ~~12<sup>th</sup>~~ 12<sup>th</sup> to the 13<sup>th</sup> August 1961, the Berlin Wall was built around the ~~under~~ West Berlin in order to prevent emigration to the west which was only causing huge issues for the GDR. There were many different factors that played a part in the building of the wall, one of which was the influence of Khrushchev, but it is understandable to say that his significance was minimal compared to the impact that emigration had. Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge the role that the West played due to its lack of involvement, ultimately helping lead to the wall. In light of these multiple factors, it is understandable to say that Khrushchev did play a part in the building of the wall but ~~the impact was not~~ significance was minimal compared to some of the other causes.

It is undeniable that Khrushchev did play a part in the building of the Berlin Wall as the leader of the USSR which was the superior power in the relationship with the GDR. In 1958, Khrushchev presented an

ultimatum to the US for them to leave West Berlin so it could become a demilitarised free city, however this was rejected and the President of the United States instead suggested negotiations should take place. Prior to this Khrushchev had always been against the building of the wall but after negotiations were not had and he did not get what he wanted he allowed the wall to be built. This clearly demonstrates how he had some significance as he was able to dictate the outcome of international events or would try to, therefore giving him great power. In addition to this as the GDR was the previous Soviet sector of Germany, it relied on the USSR for its existence. As a result of this, Khrushchev had almost autonomous rule as Ulbricht, the leader of the GDR ~~had to be subordinate~~ was ~~subordinate~~ inferior to him and needed his approval to build the wall. Due to this, the idea that Khrushchev was significant develops but it is hindered by the fact that he was not the only factor leading to the building of the Berlin Wall. It can easily be said that his role ~~was important~~ in allowing the wall to be built using the power he had as

Soviet leader was simply reactionary to the other factors that played a part, such as emigration, as he would not have felt the need to approve the wall if the GDR was not in such a dreadful situation due to the mass exodus of people. This therefore shows how Khrushchev was not that significant overall, but did undeniably play some part in the latter stages of the decision to build the wall.

One factor that clearly undermines Khrushchev's ability to be significant was the impact that mass emigration, from the GDR to the FRG, had on the GDR. Between 1949 and 1961, 2.5 million East Germans moved to the FRG, most of which were young, skilled workers the GDR was in desperate need of so that its economy could improve. As a result of so many people leaving, the economy suffered massively as there was a huge loss of skilled labour leading to the targets of the first and second five year plans ~~being~~ not being achieved on the most part. ~~leading~~ As a result of this, it is clear that emigration had a greater significance in the events leading up to the building of the Berlin Wall as it made the SED realise that they needed to act fast to try and save the GDR and its

economy from collapsing. In addition to this, ~~the~~ emigration simply undermined socialism, so by building the wall the JED was able to prove itself. As a result it can easily be said that ~~instead~~ Khrushchev was not that significant in the events leading up to the building of the Berlin Wall due to the presence of emigration. It could be claimed that Khrushchev's role was only reactionary due to the impacts of emigration as he would have wanted to save the GDR. This therefore undermines his significance as he only played a part due to the presence of emigration.

After the announcement of his ultimatum in 1958, ~~there were~~ negotiations were scheduled to take place in May 1960 in Paris with the US, however these did not take place due to the U-2 crisis. This crisis, where a US spy plane was shot down over the USSR introduces the United States and the West as a whole, as a ~~key~~ contributor in events leading up to the building of the Berlin Wall. ~~then~~ As a result of the crisis, tensions rose even more between the superpower nations making unification even less likely, therefore aiding the JED's and Khrushchev's decision to build the wall. As a result of this,

it is clear that once again, Khrushchev's role was dependent on the presence of another factor, the West, therefore undermining Khrushchev's significance ultimately leading to the conclusion that he was not that significant and the wall would likely have been built anyway.

Furthermore, it was also the lack of Western involvement and retaliation that led to the wall as when it was put up as a barb wire fence to begin with they did not respond, when the SED and Khrushchev expected them to.

This fear by the East that the West by do something was an initial factor stopping them from building the wall, especially Khrushchev. As a result of this it is clear that once again Khrushchev's role was dependent on the presence of another factor, therefore making them more significant and reducing his significance ~~overall~~ in the events leading up to the building of the wall.

Overall, it is understandable to come to the conclusion that Khrushchev's ~~was not that~~ ~~significant~~ role was not that significant in the events leading up to the building of the Berlin wall in 1961 due to other events that took place. It is undeniable that Khrushchev did play a part as leader of the USSR as he had power over the GDR, therefore granting him some significance. However, his significance is undermined on multiple occasions therefore making it

very minimal. In the events leading up to the building of the Berlin Wall other factors played bigger roles, therefore granting them greater significance and reducing Khrushchev's ~~importance~~. These factors included emigration and the West, as ~~emigrate~~ Emigrations role cannot be ignored as it led to the GDR reaching a point where it needed saving, making Khrushchev agree to let the wall be built showing his role was dependent on others. ~~Likewise~~ Likewise the role of the West and their lack of retaliation contributed to the wall and Khrushchev's acceptance of it so he let it be built, clearly undermining his role as an individual. ~~In light~~ In light of this, it is easy to conclude that Khrushchev's role was not that significant as it depended on other events taking place first, therefore making him simply reactionary and decreasing his significance.



**ResultsPlus**  
Examiner Comments

Here, the candidate analyses key issues relevant to the question, notably the role of Khrushchev, in the construction of the Berlin Wall. Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the conceptual focus of the question, and to meet most of its demands. The answer is generally well organised and communicated with clarity. In coming to a judgement, the candidate maintains a focus throughout on the significance of different factors in the building of the Wall, and overall, the judgement is supported. It received a top L4 mark.

## Question 6

This was the more popular of the essay questions for Paper 2E.2 and there were many impressive answers. The best were able to sustain their focus on the support of its citizens for the GDR in the years specified by the question. These often balanced the popularity of the SED's social welfare programmes, or the success of the GDR in international sporting events, with the obvious reliance of the regime on censorship, propaganda and terror to ensure popular conformity.

Weaker responses sometimes lacked sufficient focus on the concept of popular support for the GDR government. Others did not respect the time frame of the question and spent some time considering opposition to the SED in the years after 1985. As is common, many candidates at the lower levels, lacked sufficient knowledge and understanding of the material.

Throughout the period 1949-85, popular support for the SED wavered significantly, and whilst the SED did largely ensure the conformity of its citizens, it arguably failed to inspire genuine support ~~and~~ for its policies and ideology. Instead, their policies of control, repression, attitudes to protest, ~~and~~ censorship and restriction of freedoms ultimately contributed to a sense of begrudging acceptance of the reality of GDR citizens. Therefore, it seems clear that the SED failed in their goal of creating a socialist utopian society and inspiring genuine support from their citizens.

Resentment of <sup>the</sup> SED's ideology was apparent and consistent throughout the period, not only in terms of resentment that socialist doctrine had been imposed on the citizens, but also in the SED's attitude to its citizens. Despite a period of "normalisation" that appeared after the construction of the Berlin wall in 1961, there were continuous ways in which the population struggled to adapt to their ~~and~~ situation. ~~that~~ Previously, over 2.5 million <sup>East</sup> German citizens had emigrated to the FRG, dissatisfied

with the lack of freedom to travel or speak openly, the lack of <sup>genuine</sup> democracy and the ambitious and demanding economic policy imposed by the SED. The scale of discontent at this time can be seen in the fact that 25% of doctors left the GDR and the size of the workforce was threatened to decrease 10% over the course of the USSR's seven year plan from 1959-65. However, discontent with the SED's control of its citizens was still present despite the inability to emigrate after the wall was built in 1961. Petty protest in factories, through women covering their ears with scarves or workers mass whistling to drown out <sup>political</sup> speeches on the radio, was common, and there was widespread resentment of the privileges awarded to athletes, ~~to~~ such as travel which severely undermined the SED's attempts to inspire national unity and a shared identity within the GDR. Therefore it is evident that in spite of the SED's attempts to stem emigration, the ideology that motivated many to leave initially was still present much later, suggesting that outward conformity was the major outcome of the SED's policy from 1949-85.

Equally, at various points throughout the period, protest against the SED was common, hinting at

a failure to ensure popular support. A wide degree of discontent was shown in the 1953 June Uprising, in which 497,000 workers went on strike and 418,000 were involved in demonstrations against work norms and the SED. Although this protest was put down by force, it was arguably not a success for the SED, whose slow response was in part due to their reluctance to rely on the KVP, who they feared may have been disloyal. Equally, the brutality of the Soviet troops that came in support of the SED, killing 18 protesters and the fact that 1300 were arrested, created the impression that the SED ruled through force, and had not inspired support from its citizens. In the 1970s and 80s, protest movements gained popularity largely through help from the Protestant Church, the safety of which allowed dissident groups to publish subversive journals on human rights, freedoms and peace, all of which the SED was against according to public opinion. Resentment was transformed into growing protest movements, like Blues Masses, held from ~~1976~~ <sup>the late 1970s</sup> to 1986 by pastor Rainer ~~Eppelmann~~ Eppelmann and Blues musician Gunther Holwas. In these meetings, which were hugely popular in Berlin, people gathered to hear sermons interspersed with Blues music, which went directly against the SED's attempts to control the church. Protests over the introduction of compulsory

military training in schools in the 1970s were widespread, as was opposition to military conscription. The Protestant Church was in fact instrumental in the creation of the Construction Force, a ~~new~~ <sup>an alternative</sup> to conscription for conscientious objectors. 80% of its members were practicing Christians, hinting at the level of popular dislike for the SED within the church. However, people were also discontent with the SED's policies, and in the 1980s, most letters of complaint to senior officials were about the poor quality of housing. This affected everyone regardless of religion and long waiting lists, bureaucracy, and poor conditions like dampness, or lifts being ~~not~~ unreliable were huge sources of disillusionment with the SED. By the 1980s only 60% of dwellings had an inside toilet, hinting at the ~~poor~~ disparity in living conditions with the west, which was made clearer through the easing of travel restrictions from 1964 onwards and the consistently high popularity of western media. Overall, then, it seems evident that the population of the GDR was far more dissatisfied than they were confident in the SED, suggesting that they failed to ensure significant support.

The SED did have some success in ensuring the

cooperation of its citizens, largely through intimidation and propaganda. The Stasi, created in 1950, was a consistently present means of control and had a significant impact on the population. Stasi employees worked in most areas of people's lives, like schools, factories, offices, airports, churches and passport offices, and were authorised to check mail, bug telephones and use psychological torture. They also employed an extensive network of informers, IMs, who may be bribed or blackmailed into providing information about the citizens of the GDR. This was well known at the time, and acted as a deterrent for opposition, and whilst it did guarantee some stability for the SED, their policy largely failed to inspire a more positive impression of the leadership, arguably causing more resentment than support. Equally, the FDJ attempted to indoctrinate its young members with a pro-SED ideology, through political messaging in ~~these~~ <sup>recreational</sup> events like discos and holiday camps. Participation was high - 1.2 million of the 2.2 million FDJ members attended a holiday camp in 1983, but political messaging was largely ignored by FDJ members, who viewed the youth group as an opportunity to socialise. Young people were a significant failure in the SED's attempts to inspire support, ~~partly~~ in the later

period of the GDR a variety of western influences, which had always been present among young people, began to encourage counter-cultural movements and challenges to the SED's authority. The Capitol gang in Leipzig, for example, was infamous for listening openly to western music outside the Capitol cinema and provoking police, hinting that not only had the SED failed to inspire support and conformity in young people, who had been encouraged to sign pledges to not listen to western music, but also that the SED's control was weakening, as western influences ~~had~~ increased in popularity. They were forced to decriminalise western newspapers in 1961 and western TV in 1974 simply because their consumption was so widespread in spite of the SED's attempts to control media. Even though the SED directly controlled 70% of all publications in the GDR, their censorship was ~~inefficient~~ ineffective in fostering ideological conformity amongst their citizens. Both this lack of conformity and the presence of western influences contributed to the impression that the population largely disregarded the SED's attempts to control them, and these attempts at control, being well known, caused further resentment and decreased support for the SED. Thus, it seems illogical to claim

that the SED's policies of repression and control had any success in ~~an~~ encouraging support.

Overall, it is clear that in spite of the SED's consistent attempts to encourage support from their citizens, their policies, authority and ideology were consistently undermined. The SED continuously faced challenges from their citizens <sup>which</sup> they repeatedly failed to address, and failed to inspire the sense that they could be trusted to prioritise the interests of their citizens ~~or~~ over the interests of the SED ~~themselves~~ <sup>itself</sup>. Thus, the popularity of protest movements, popular discontent, resentment and dissidence ~~to~~ suggests that ultimately the SED was unsuccessful in gaining significant popular support from 1949 to 1985, and was only successful in ~~the~~ maintaining the outward conformity of its citizens.



**ResultsPlus**  
Examiner Comments

This answer sustains an analytical focus on the degree of popular support for the SED government throughout. Its argument is logical and coherent and communicated with clarity and precision. Knowledge is deployed that meets the demands of the question in full and, in coming to a fully substantiated judgement, valid criteria are established and applied. It was awarded a top L5 mark.

## Paper Summary

Based on their performance on this paper, candidates are offered the following advice:

### Section A

- Candidates should go beyond paraphrasing the content of the sources to draw out reasoned and developed inferences
- Candidates should move beyond stereotypical approaches to the nature/purpose and authorship of the source by looking at and explaining the specific stance and/or purpose of the writer
- Contextual knowledge should not be used to list all the information that is missing from the sources, unless omission was the aim of the author
- Contextual knowledge should be linked to the material provided in the source
- Candidates should make use of the sources together at some point in the answer.

### Section B

- Spending a few minutes planning helps to ensure the second order concept is correctly identified
- Candidates must provide more precise contextual knowledge as evidence. Weaker responses lacked depth and sometimes range
- Candidates should avoid a narrative/descriptive approach; this undermines the analysis that is required for the higher levels
- Candidates need to be aware of key dates as identified in the specification so that they can address the questions with chronological precision
- Candidates should try to explore the links between issues rather than merely present a list of factors
- Subject-specific terminology must be used in a precise and accurate manner.

## **Grade boundaries**

Grade boundaries for this, and all other papers, can be found on the website on this link:

<https://qualifications.pearson.com/en/support/support-topics/results-certification/grade-boundaries.html>

