



# **Examiners' Report June 2023**

**GCE History 9HI0 2F**

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## Introduction

It was pleasing to see candidates able to engage effectively across the ability range with A Level paper 9HI02F, which deals with India, c 1914-48: the road to independence (9HI02F.1) and South Africa, 1948-94: from apartheid state to 'rainbow nation' (9HI02F.2).

The paper is divided into two sections. Section A contains a compulsory question that is based on two linked sources. It assesses source analysis and evaluation skills (AO2). Section B comprises a choice of essays that assess understanding of the period in depth (AO1) by targeting five second order concepts – cause, consequence, change and continuity, similarity and difference, and significance. Candidates appeared to organise their time effectively and there was very little evidence of candidates being unable to attempt both answers within the time allocated. There appears to have been an increase this year in the number of scripts that were seen that posed problems for examiners with a lack of legibility of handwriting; examiners are only able to give credit for what they can read.

In Section A, the strongest answers were able to develop reasoned and supported inferences based on the sources. Such responses evaluated the sources thoroughly in relation to the demands of the enquiry on the basis of both the contextual knowledge that was on offer and through an awareness of the nature, origin and purpose of the source. It is disappointing to note that a number of candidates talked in general terms, rather than explicitly addressing the focus of the enquiry. This question requires candidates to use the sources 'together'. It was pleasing to see that candidates had taken on board the advice offered last summer and relatively few are now attempting to use the sources 'together' throughout the entirety of the answer, which last year led to some problems for candidates. Rather, candidates used the sources 'together' to develop clearly focused points that related to issues raised by the sources. This is a much more effective approach. Some candidates used their contextual knowledge to continue to describe events in great detail, rather than using it to illuminate and to discuss the sources. This sometimes resulted in candidates not dealing with the sources adequately. In other cases, candidates might offer up little or no contextual knowledge to support their arguments and analysis. These were not always weaker candidates; some answers were seen that were strong in bullet points 1 and 3 of the mark scheme but had very little that could be credited for bullet point 2. The impact of this was to hold down the marks that were achievable in this section of the paper.

In section B, it was clear that most candidates had a secure knowledge base, but this was not always effectively used to address the specific focus of the questions posed. Stronger answers clearly understood the importance of identifying the appropriate second order concept that was being targeted by the question. Weaker candidates either engaged in a narrative approach that made links to the question in the conclusion or alternatively shaped their responses analytically but lacked sufficient substance and accurate contextual knowledge to support the arguments that they were making. More responses were seen this summer that had a tendency to only deal with one side of an argument; some of these were a sophisticated analysis of that one side, showing the links between the issues that were raised, but it is essential that candidates acknowledge the existence of a debate, where appropriate. Candidates are encouraged to ensure that they take the most appropriate approach to answering a question. Candidates should always aim to show the links between the issues raised, not merely to present a list of factors. Candidates need to be aware of the chronological parameters of questions and to ensure that they write across the chronology. Equally, the evidence that is presented should come from within the timeframe of the chronology of the question. It was disappointing this summer to note that a number of candidates seemed to have only a weak grasp on the timing of key events.

The candidates' performance on individual questions is considered in the next section.

## Question 1

Stronger candidates were able to present a nuanced approach in their response and could appreciate, for example, that whilst both sources were critical of Jinnah, source 1 was rather more measured in those criticisms and held Gandhi to bear some of the responsibility for Jinnah's attitudes. Some candidates struggled to find appropriate contextual knowledge to support their analysis in this question. The consequence in these cases was that there was either very limited contextual knowledge or candidates drew on material that was at some chronological distance from the sources. However, some of the material at a chronological distance could be made relevant, although often was not. Some candidates with extensive contextual knowledge tended to use this as the basis of an argument, rather than directly linking it to illuminate what was actually in the sources. It is essential that candidates read the sources carefully. Source 2, for example, references the fact that Farley has used 'press reports' as the basis of some of her comments, but very few candidates made reference to this rather important point as part of their evaluation of the source.

When used together, Source 1 and 2 are very useful for a historian investigating the reasons for failure of the 1945 Simla conference. Source 1, written by Wavell, is useful as evidence for British opinions on why the Simla conference failed. The fact it was circulated as a secret document <sup>increases</sup> its usefulness because it <sup>could allow</sup> Wavell to be more candid about his opinions. This is because he wouldn't have to worry about <sup>or causing tensions with</sup> upsetting any of the groups so he could be able to speak freely, expressing his frustrations with the various nationalist leaders. Source 2 is useful to nuance the reasons given in Source 1, ~~its~~ <sup>international</sup> because it provides an international view on the events. Both sources are written in 1945, allowing a historian to develop a comprehensive idea of who people blamed the failure on at the time.

Source 1, whilst identifying members of both Congress and the Muslim League, states that the "immediate cause" of the conference's failings was "Jinnah's inflexibility" regarding the idea of separate electorates <sup>the safeguarding of</sup> and Muslim minority rights. This implies that Jinnah was the principle reason for the political deadlock that occurred. Whilst most concession attempts at this time were ~~the result~~ <sup>limited</sup> by the issue of separate electorates, Jinnah was especially inflexible during the Simla Conference. Having declared that partition

was the only way for Muslim rights to be protected, at Lahore in 1940, his political actions ~~thereon~~ <sup>thereon</sup> were influenced by the desire for partition. Perhaps his ~~inflexibility~~ <sup>arrogance</sup> was a result of the August Offer in 1940 that guaranteed ~~that~~ no constitutional changes would be made without prior agreement with the Muslim League, therefore he could afford to be inflexible with his approach to cross-party discussions. Source 2 ratifies Jinnah's Wavell's blame of Jinnah, <sup>due to his stubbornness</sup> stating that he "insisted on prior acceptance of the Muslim League's right to name Muslim members of the new Executive Council." However unlike Source 1 ~~which~~ which claims Jinnah's 'fear' of a ~~the~~ Congress-led India 'cannot be dismissed', Farley believes 'such a demand is difficult to justify'. These differing opinions suggest that different people viewed Jinnah's actions to varying degrees of responsibility. Therefore, when used together, the two sources are very useful ~~in~~ as evidence that ~~not everyone~~ <sup>the view of the</sup> time that Jinnah's inflexibility regarding minority representation was based on valid reasoning was not shared by all individuals.

Furthermore, Source 2 comments that Wavell's 'tone was not very ~~helpful~~ helpful'. This implies that the conference was a complete failure and there was no chance of advancement in an agreement that would satisfy ~~both~~ the demands and desires of Congress and the Muslim League. However, Source 1 contradicts this saying the ~~conference~~ discussions between the groups were 'less heated than I expected', ~~conveying~~ <sup>conveying</sup> a ~~helpful~~ <sup>positive</sup> tone'. This ~~slightly~~ <sup>slightly</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> ~~its~~ <sup>its</sup> usefulness of Source 2 because

Since the author of Source 1 was at the conference himself therefore is probably more valid in terms of the tone of the conference. Yet the fact that the two sources contrast actually increases their usefulness when used together because it would allow historians to see that the ~~failures of the conf~~ reasons for the failure of the conference were multifaceted and cannot be pinpointed to one ~~of~~ <sup>specific</sup> groups, or one specific individual, but rather that by this point, the ~~big~~ glaring differences between Congress and the Muslim League meant that the political deadlock remained unbroken.

Overall, it is clear that when used together, the two sources are very useful for a historian researching the reasons for failure of the Simla conference. Though Wavell and Farley's overarching arguments differ, they both place some degree of blame on Jinnah and his stubbornness surrounding Muslim 'safeguards' as mentioned in Source 2. Source 2 refines this, implying that these 'safeguards' were more specifically about issues with membership on the 'Executive Council' set up by the British, ~~during the 1935 Government~~ allowing a historian to use both together to fill in gaps and nuance the points made in both.



Overall, this is a secure level 4 response. Look carefully at the second page of the answer, which demonstrates an effective approach to using the sources together. The answer draws inferences from both the sources, links those inferences and explains the slightly different approaches that the authors take. It is clearly linked to the focus of the question at this point.

## Question 2

Some strong answers were seen to this question, where candidates confidently interrogated the sources and used them together to develop a strong analysis and evaluation. It is important that candidates read the question carefully. A number of responses were seen that criticised the sources for only focusing on 1990, when that was precisely what the question was asking candidates to do. Other candidates saw this question as an opportunity to write an answer based on why apartheid ended, with only limited consideration of what weight could be attached to the sources when examining the importance of de Klerk. It is equally important that candidates look carefully at the caption of the sources and use the information provided appropriately. Source 3 makes it clear that de Klerk is recalling a speech that he had made in 1990 eight years later, but many candidates wrote as if this source was the actual speech. Candidates tended to use source 3 more effectively than source 4. In source 4, many candidates picked up on the reference to Thatcher and correctly discussed the role of international pressure as an alternative influence on the dismantling of apartheid. However, a significant minority of candidates suggested that Young was arguing that de Klerk was entirely unimportant.

Sources 3 and 4 display varying levels of appreciation for the impact of de Klerk's reforms for the dismantling of apartheid. Whilst there is significant scepticism, particularly from Source 4, that de Klerk really had a significant impact on the dismantling of apartheid, broadly there is consensus between the two on this topic. In this consensus lies the sources' primary value to the historian; whilst coming from different origins, they agree that de Klerk's reforms amounted to a 'fundamental policy shift' for the National Party. Taken together, therefore, sources 3 & 4 are very useful for an historical investigation into the importance of de Klerk in the process of dismantling apartheid in 1990.

Source 3 is incredibly useful for the historian in investigating the impact of de Klerk on the process of dismantling apartheid. Firstly, it is from de Klerk himself, and would therefore have ~~provide~~ a very useful assessment of the impact of the author. It focuses primarily on a very significant speech made by de Klerk, whilst President, in February 1990.

It should be noted, though, that an autobiography may have a tendency to focus on an individual's positive impacts rather than their failures or missteps. Source 3 reveals that de Klerk felt as though his most important move (the one that 'raised the greatest expectations') was the release of Mandela in February 1990. Indeed, this was one of De Klerk's most important moves in the year 1990; his release of Mandela (and other political prisoners) signalled to the world and to South Africa that the National Party was making a 'fundamental policy shift'. Another way in which the source illuminates de Klerk's significance is in how it describes the 'meetings with Mandels', which indicates that the groundwork de Klerk laid in developing negotiations was very important. Indeed, initially the ANC/NP relationship was civil; ~~between the two~~ the leaders 'accepted one another's integrity' and were able to get negotiations off the ground. In these ways, Source 3 is very useful for an investigation into the importance of de Klerk in dismantling apartheid in 1990.

Source 4 is also useful for such an ~~historical~~ historical investigation, but for different reasons. It comes from a journalist's ~~book~~<sup>report</sup>, published in the year in question, who was aiming to provide a

clear and factually accurate appraisal of the significance of de Klerk and the extent of progress, as journalists do. Firstly, Source 4 deals with how suitable de Klerk was personally for dismantling apartheid. It claims de Klerk 'had the courage and intelligence to get the message', and this is convincing. Certainly, de Klerk was personally suited well to his task of dismantling apartheid. He was well-liked within his party, respected by his political opponents (particularly the ANC and particularly in the aftermath of his February 1990 speech) but most importantly he understood the gravity of the situation in South Africa. ~~In this way, his personal traits.~~ The source also touches upon the actions de Klerk took in 1990. It details a 'shift in policy' that he took and that this policy was to '[move] to end apartheid'. Most significantly, it claims 'de Klerk says that constitutional apartheid will soon be ~~the~~ entirely eliminated. Whilst it expresses scepticism about this claim, this is only because of its timing (being written in May 1990), before de Klerk delivered on this promise by removing acts like the Group Areas Act and the Population Registration Act later in the year. In this way, Source 4 is incredibly useful for an investigation into the significance of De Klerk in the process of dismantling apartheid in 1990.

Taken together, though, the sources are at their most useful. There is revealing consensus between them on a number of key issues relating to de Klerk's importance. Firstly, both sources agree that de Klerk was responsible for a 'fundamental policy shift' - source 4 even goes as far as describing this shift as a 'wiping out of the ideology of white supremacy'. There is little doubt, in fact, that de Klerk did change South African history - the National Party's policy went from being one of gradual, piecemeal reform under Botha to wholesale, fundamental reform under de Klerk, such as the unbanning of the ANC, PAC & SACP in 1990. Both sources also detail the 'relief' from 'modern Afrikaner politicians' that followed de Klerk's reforms. This suggests that another aspect to de Klerk's importance is how he was able to get white South Africa on-side with his reforms. Indeed, a referendum conducted revealed that 68% of whites were in favour of a new political settlement. The sources' origins are significant here; that they come from opposite sides of the argument (one from de Klerk and one vaguely critical of him, although only because of its publication date) and still agree on these points indicates to a high degree of certainty that de Klerk was very important for dismantling

apartheid in 1990. Thus, the sources are useful together.

In conclusion, sources 3 & 4 are very useful for the historian to investigate de Klerk's importance in dismantling apartheid. Individually, they reveal how he released Mandela, made 'fundamental policy shifts' and more. Taken together, though, the sources support one another's arguments and indicate how de Klerk gathered significant white support & changed NP policy. Therefore, the sources are very useful for the historian to investigate the dismantling of apartheid in 1990.



**ResultsPlus**  
Examiner Comments

This is a strong level 5 response. The answer stands back from the sources and interrogates them with discrimination and confidence. The claims made by the sources are tested as part of the evaluation of the sources and such arguments are well supported by the use of relevant contextual knowledge.

### Question 3

This was the more popular question in Section B for 9HI02F.1. Most candidates were able to demonstrate detailed contextual knowledge for this question. Stronger candidates dealt confidently with the non-cooperation campaign, before moving on to weigh its influence relative to that of other contributing factors that aided the rise of nationalist thinking. Weaker responses tended to describe the events with only limited linkage made between the events and the precise terms of the question. Alternatively, such responses would follow the descriptive passage by asserting that this proved/disproved the issue being described was the most important influence on the growth of nationalism without any analysis of the basis of the claim being made. It is crucial for candidates to be aware of the chronology that is required in questions. There was a significant minority of candidates who spent some time discussing, for example, the salt *satyagraha* in their responses to this question, despite the fact that this was not within the parameters of the dates required by this question. A number of responses did not directly engage with the focus of this question; for example, they discussed whether the 1920-22 campaign was a success or not, rather than dealing with its influence on the growth of nationalism. Indeed, a significant minority of candidates completely ignored the word 'influence' in the question.

PLANS

~~##~~ 1919

LACK OF TRUST FOLLOWING  
ROWLATT - CHANGING MIND

1935

YES

SALT SATYAGRAHA

MEDIA

AWAWARENESS

EMERGENCE OF  
GANDHI

NO

WNI

BROUGHT TOGETHER ~~E+M~~  
H+M

WAD EFFORT

HOME RULE LEAGUES

SCANDAL ~~BRIT~~

ARBITRARY

ROWLATT ACTS

GOV OF INDIA ACT

Between the years 1914 and 1922, a sense of nationalism, the want to leave the control of the British and become an independent nation, began to grow rapidly. The emergence of Gandhi and his novel idea of the satyagraha provided a new way to fight against the Raj for everyone in society - spreading nationalism countrywide. However, other factors such as the nationalist sentiment that grew following WWI as well as the Indian reaction to the horrific actions of the British were arguably more significant in the early growth of nationalism in India.

Gandhi's salt satyagraha, in which Indians boycotted the salt tax by using sea salt instead of British taxed salt. The salt tax was an emotive issue that everyone could get involved in, including both the richest and the poorest in India, making the cause accessible to all and showcasing how all were affected by the control of the Raj, allowing nationalism to grow quickly amongst a broad group of people. Addition-

ally, the salt satyagraha attracted a significant amount of media attention as reporters followed Gandhi and his 75000 followers to the sea coast. This news spread both nationally and internationally, bringing in support for nationalism from other, especially dominion, countries. This also spread an awareness of civil disobedience and therefore ~~led~~ spread Indian nationalism to a wider audience. The salt satyagraha and civil disobedience also led to a larger spotlight on Gandhi, who quickly became a key figure in the nationalist movement, and played a key role in its spread as he garnered support. However, while the civil disobedience campaign did result to more awareness about nationalism, it was not the sole reason for its growth.

The actions of the British between 1914 and 1922 and the horrified reaction of the Indian public arguably played the biggest role in the growth of the nationalist movement. The events of the Amritsar massacre, the killing of hundreds

and injury of a thousand innocent Indian worshippers by British general Dyer, resulted in a ~~mass~~ massive anti-British sentiment and growth in support of the nationalist movement. This event further increased the distrust Indians felt for the British ~~and~~ administration and resulted in a stronger push for independence. The Rowlatt Acts that remained in place following WWI were also met with horror ~~by~~ from the Indian people. These acts included imprisonment without a trial, prohibited protesting and anti-war speech, and trial without a jury - all of which were expected to be lifted after ~~wartime~~ wartime finished. This showed distrust of Indians by the British which resulted in anger ~~from~~. This then further led to an uprising of nationalism and anti-British feeling. The Government of India Act ~~in~~ 1919 was also met with discontent from Indians as, contrasted with the Rowlatt Acts, it showed Britain to be indecisive about what to do with India. It also showed that the British were in no rush to give India any form

of independence, which resulted in another wave of nationalism as waves of unrest and protest followed the announcement of the Act. Therefore, this shows that the actions of the British administration played a key role in the growth of nationalism in India as Indians began to resent the control of the British.

Furthermore, the first civil-disobedience campaign also played a role in the growth of nationalism in India. The widespread nature in people peacefully disregarding the law increased - people across all of India stopped payment of taxes, ~~buying~~ buying imported goods, and attending official events all as part of this campaign. The outcome of this civil disobedience campaign also led to the emergence of Home Rule Leagues, operated by Annie Besant and Bal Gangadhar Tilak, which spread nationalism and political awareness to the poorest parts of India, helping nationalism grow everywhere through speeches and lectures. However, this initial civil

disobedience campaign led to outbreaks of violence across India, especially in big urban areas like Bengal and the Punjab, and Gandhi had to stop the campaign early.

~~Another~~ Other factors also played a key role, such as WWI. Following WWI, Muslims and Congress joined together for the cause of nationalism through the Poona Pact, one of the few times that the two groups worked together. This allowed both groups to strengthen, gaining more supporters as they did. Also, following WWI, Indians expected some form of compensation for their war effort, and they were angered when they did not receive it, creating an increase in demand for home rule - expanding the nationalism movement at the time.

Overall, the acts of the British were the most significant factor towards the growth in nationalism.

ism in India between 1914 and 1922. While civil disobedience and other factors did play a role, their failure to make a lasting impact means that the severity of the British's actions still led to the biggest push for British admin to leave India.



**ResultsPlus**  
Examiner Comments

This answer achieved level 3. There is an effective introduction, but the answer does not build on this and there are a number of descriptive passages to be seen in the response. The answer also misidentifies the 1920-22 non-cooperation campaign that should be the focus of the response, although it does have some reference to the correct campaign as one of its other factors.



**ResultsPlus**  
Examiner Tip

Ensure that you know the key events of your material and the dates that apply to them so that you are able to answer the question that has been set.

## Question 4

This was the less popular question in Section B for 9HI02F.1. Some of the candidates who selected this question knew remarkably little about either of the two Government of India Acts. Often, the only reference to this was an assertion at the start and/or the end of the response stating that they were or that they were not important, with no evidence to support this assertion. The remainder of the response was then devoted to a discussion of other factors that it was claimed were more important (or occasionally less important), but this could not be demonstrated as no discussion of the stated factor had taken place. There were, however, responses seen to this question where the candidate had a secure grasp on the terms of the legislation and was able to develop a clear analysis from this to reach clearly reasoned analytical judgements about the extent and degree of change that the two acts brought in the relationship between Britain and India, so that the notion of 'fundamental change' was confidently addressed. These answers were mixed between those that were entirely focused on the Government of India Acts and those that weighed these against other factors – both approaches were entirely legitimate.

I disagree that the Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935 made fundamental changes to India's relationship with Britain because whilst it gave India greater concessions to self-government, they still had a lack of political power. The phrase 'fundamental changes' implies that we should acknowledge whether the changes were to a significant or large extent.

It could be argued that the Government of India Act 1919 made fundamental changes to India's relationship with Britain because ~~it was~~ it was a step towards self-government. For instance the Act gave India control over ~~the~~ health, agriculture and education. This was more power than what they had before, showing an improvement of relationships between India and Britain. The Act also granted dyarchy, which was a division of power between ~~the~~ Britain and India. This ~~improves~~ improves relationships

a) ~~Britain get more~~ India get more control over the runnings of their country than before, with Britain having total control since 1858. The Act also called for separate electorates for minorities, ~~that were~~ such as Sikhs and Muslims. This would allow for a better relationship between Britain and minority leaders like Jinnah of the Muslim League. Additionally, the Viceroy would have to be advised of a Council of 3 Indian civilians. This shows more Indian influence in politics which ultimately heals relations with Britain, which were poor in the past due to a lack of political voice. Therefore the Government of India Act 1919 made fundamental changes to India's relationship with Britain as they were one step closer to self-government, which is what they wanted.

I believe that the Government of India Act 1919 did not make fundamental changes to India's relationship with Britain as the concessions given were very small. For instance, whilst India gained control over agriculture, health and education,

Britain retained control over defence, foreign affairs and taxation. These were the important aspects of ~~running~~ running a country, showing how India still had a lack of power. This would do no actual improvements to India's relationship with Britain. Additionally, 1 in 10 male Indians could vote. They were still only the rich who were likely to support British rule. ~~But~~ Also ~~that~~ whilst enfranchisement extended, still only 1% of the general population could vote. This shows how India's relationship with Britain would stay the same as there was little improvement in voting rights. Therefore, the Government of India Act 1919 did not make fundamental changes to India's relationship with Britain as there was little progression to self-~~gov~~ government, with a lack of political power.

It could be argued that the Government of India Act 1935 made fundamental changes to India's relationship with Britain because of India's increased role in government. For instance, the Act states

that ~~India would be~~ ~~Britain~~ the viceroy would be bound to consult a mostly Indian Executive Committee. This shows relationships between India and Britain improving as Britain would legally have to check with India regarding any political statements. This improves India's political power. The Act also suggested dividing India into 11 provinces with control of all policies (except from defence and foreign affairs). This would give India greater political power, making them one step closer to self-government. As self-government is the end goal, these concessions would improve India's opinion on the British. Therefore the Government of India Act 1935 made fundamental changes to ~~the~~ India's relationship with Britain as it proved to India that Britain were willing to grant further concessions towards self-government.

Despite this, the Government of India Act 1935 ~~did not~~ did not make fundamental changes to India's relationship with Britain as ~~it was~~ the concessions were

not honoured. This is evident when Lord Linlithgow announced that India was at war with Germany in 1939, without consulting India. Congress were furious as the Government of India Act 1935 stated that Britain were bound to consult the Indian Executive Committee. This ~~took~~ took back any improvements that the Act supposedly made, as the claims were not followed through. This led to Congress state governments resigning in protest showing their dissatisfaction towards the British. Additionally, the policy of separate electorates for minority groups, like the Sikhs and Muslims, did not please Congress as it essentially reinforced the idea of divide and rule. This shows how whilst the Act should have healed relations it didn't, because it only benefited the British causing deeper divisions within India. Therefore the Government of India Act 1935 did not make fundamental changes to India's relationship with Britain as it had the potential to be beneficial, yet only benefited Britain.

To conclude, the Government of India Acts 1919 and 1935 did not make fundamental changes to India's relationship with Britain. Despite closer steps to self-government and a greater Indian voice in government, these changes were only to a small ~~scale~~ scale. Therefore these changes were significant in changing the relationship between India and Britain, but not 'fundamental' as Britain still obtained the majority of the power ~~of~~ over India seen with the failure to ~~to~~ grant influential policies that would have benefited India.



**ResultsPlus**  
Examiner Comments

This is a level 5 response that takes the approach of focusing on the Government of India Acts. It has a very secure knowledge of the details of the legislation, and it uses this and a broader contextual understanding to test the validity of the claim in the question.

## Question 5

Both questions in section B of 2FI02F.2 were tackled by a similar number of candidates. The majority of candidates had a sound knowledge of at least some of the key developments of this period, although a number focused on iconic events, such as at Sharpeville, at the expense of elements of the earlier period. Some responses did stray out of the time period for this question, for example, discussions of the Rivonia trial and Soweto were seen. Stronger answers to this question focused clearly on the terms of the question, exploring the extent to which it was the weaknesses of African nationalism or the strengths of the National Party that were responsible for the failure of opposition to apartheid, frequently linking the two in their analysis and arguing that the latter was actually responsible for the former. Weaker responses often defaulted to describing a number of events that related to either African nationalist weakness or National Party strength. However, such responses made only limited linkage to the specific focus of the question. There was also some misunderstanding by some candidates of the focus of the question, with some candidates writing at great length, for example, about whether African nationalism was weak or not.

The statement claims that in the years 1948-61, the weaknesses of African nationalism were more significant than the strengths of the National Party in explaining the failure of opposition to apartheid. This statement is correct insofar as it identifies the fact that weakness in African nationalist groups and the consequence this had on opposition to apartheid, however the statement fails to fully comprehend the strengths and actions taken by the National Party to secure apartheid against opposition and is not correct when claiming that the weakness of African nationalism was the most significant reason.

The National Party were elected under Jan Smuts in 1948, largely as a result of proportional representation, allowing scarcely populated Afrikaner farmlands to have more sway than smaller, more populated areas, and were swift to ensure that they secured the power. They introduced legislation in 1952, banning black, coloured and Indian people from voting. This ensured that these ~~populated~~ peoples could not vote for the United Party as many of them had done. This one example of the strength of the National Party as without securing power they could not enact their scheme of apartheid. Another example of the strength of the National Party

is in how they changed the judicial system, allowing supreme courts to have three judges instead of one and having the Minister of State select the judges himself. As well as this, the use of brute force to get apartheid legislation through was often used, such as in the Bantu Education Act of 1953, as there was typically a two thirds majority needed to pass legislation but this was ignored. Whilst these are not commendable actions, they are a clear sign of strength and an evident reason behind the lack of substantial opposition to apartheid. ~~The most~~ Another crucial reason is the Unlawful Organisations Act in 1960, following the Sharpeville Massacre, which banned the African National Congress ~~and~~ (ANC) and Pan African Congress (PAC). The banning of these organisations was late in the period but served as a very useful example of how the National Party used to strength to crush ~~at~~ the opposition they faced between 1948-61. Therefore, the strength of the National Party is the most significant reason for the failure of opposition to apartheid.

The weakness of African nationalism did have a large impact as well however. The ANC was the largest opposition group, founded in 1912. ~~The~~

ANC was also the main source of opposition throughout the period 1948-61. In the early period the ANC had low levels of activity but going into the 1950s activity began to increase. One could argue that the introduction of the Freedom Charter in 1953 was a strength of African nationalism as it represented a codification of values held by African nationalists such as equal representation, however it could also be viewed as a weakness as it caused resentment amongst the pan-Africanists who believed that Africa should be for Africans and later formed the PAC. This is an example of why African nationalism struggled to form solid and consistent opposition to apartheid and therefore is a significant reason for the lack of it. One should also consider the Rivonia Trial between 1956 and 1961 which involved more than 90 key members of the ANC and other organisations. ~~The result~~ Whilst these accused were eventually acquitted in 1961, their involvement only served to further the weaknesses of African nationalism. However, the trial was a result of the National Party and thus reinforces the idea that the National Party's strength was more significant. As well as this African nationalism was too divided in this period, not only by ideology like the ANC and PAC but also, by race and gender. Women were not originally allowed to join the

ANC and white, ~~and~~ Indian and coloured people were also refused membership despite alliances with organisations like the South African Indian Congress (SAIC). This division further increased the difficulty of displaying unified opposition. ~~While~~ Whilst African nationalist groups did exist and opposition was present, the weaknesses ~~of~~ of the groups greatly affected the effectiveness, however ~~the~~ the weaknesses ~~did~~ were not as significant as the National Party strengths.

The African nationalist did have successes as well, further diminishing the significance of its weaknesses. One notable example ~~though it is~~ ~~is~~ is the outcry caused by the Sharpeville Massacre ~~on~~ on the 21st March 1960 in which police opened fire on peaceful protesters and ~~the~~ photographs of the dead protesters caused outcry around the world. This is arguably the cause of the only impactful ~~of~~ opposition to apartheid in the years 1948-61. However, one could argue that it is not necessarily a success as the murders were not the intention and the protest was a further example of division between African nationalist groups as the ANC had already

announced a march for 10 days later and thus, it is hard to argue there were any real successes, especially when considering the massacre also led to the banning of the ANC and PAC.

In conclusion, the statement correctly identifies the weaknesses of African nationalism in the period 1940-61 however it goes too far in saying these weaknesses were more significant than the strength of the National Party in explaining the failure of opposition to apartheid. This is because the strength of the National Party led to both strict legislation and swift and harsh responses to any potential opposition, such as the Unlawful Organisations Act in 1960, thus demonstrating how this had a more significant impact than the weakness of African nationalism.



This is a level 4 response. It has clearly understood the focus of the question. It deals with both the weaknesses of African nationalism and the strengths of the National Party in explaining the failure of opposition to apartheid and, at times, explains the links between the two factors. There is some drift off the focus of the question, very occasionally, where the answer shifts to looking at the strengths of African nationalism, but the response soon comes back into focus. There are also some errors, that may simply be the consequence of time pressure, e.g. mistaking the name of the Rivonia Trial for the Treason Trial; the candidate was clearly writing about the Treason Trial. Minor errors of this type would not lead to a reduction in marks, as long as there was sufficient correct material within the response, as is the case with this answer.



Ensure that you maintain your focus directly on the terms of the question set and that you do not allow your comments to drift to a different question focus.

## Question 6

Both questions in section B of 9HI02F.2 were tackled by a similar number of candidates. The majority of candidates were able to draw upon relevant contextual knowledge in order to answer this question, although some answers did stray into the later 1980s. Strong answers were seen that were able to fully engage the focus of the question and make clearly substantiated judgements on the extent to which there was a serious undermining of the National Party's power, often concluding that its power was undermined, but not seriously, at least in this period. A significant minority of candidates did not fully engage with the focus of this question. In such cases, the responses often dealt with the reasons that the National Party's power was undermined, rather than considering how accurate it was to claim that its power was seriously undermined. The success of such answers depended on the extent to which candidates linked this approach to the precise terms of the question. Many candidates had an excellent grasp on the ways in which the position of the National Party was undermined in this period. However, some of these were less confident in dealing with the counter arguments, often offering no counter argument at all.

There are a number of reasons to suggest that in the years 1968-83, National Party (NP) power was seriously undermined such as the increasing international pressures on them as well as the challenges they faced domestically such as rising population. However, it is clear that, in reality, NP power was not seriously undermined because of Botha's increasing control of the country and the insignificance of many supposed domestic challenges.

Firstly, it is quite accurate to say that the power of the National Party was seriously undermined because of the many international pressures they faced from 1968-83. For example, many countries in southern Africa gained independence in the 1970s such as Mozambique and Angola after the overthrow of the fascist government of Portugal. These countries were now ruled by the very socialist FRELIMO and MPLA respectively. This highlights how South Africa was becoming isolated ideologically in Africa and was increasingly surrounded by countries hostile to its aims, especially as SWAPO gained more ground and Zimbabwe became independent under Mugabe in 1980, making the NP's grip on southern Africa weaker. Additionally, these newly independent countries posed a threat to South Africa (SA) by creating the

Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SODCC). This reveals an attempt by southern Africa to wrestle away the dominance of SA in the region by forging their own trading links, making particular use of Mozambique-based ports, a clear challenge to NP superiority in the region, undermining their power in these years. Finally, the international consensus was moving solidly against SA as the global anti-apartheid movement (AAM) began to gain support by focusing on human rights with events celebrating Mandela's birthdays in 1978 and 1983, the <sup>UK</sup> Labour cabinet signing a card for him in the former year. This demonstrates the increasing condemnation of SA's regime and pressure from Western powers to change, particularly as ever Reagan supplied disinvestment in the early 1980s. Therefore, NP power was seriously undermined from 1968-83 because of international pressures.

Furthermore, it is accurate to say that NP power was seriously undermined from 1968-83 because of domestic challenges. For example, this period was part of a rise in population from 11m to 29m between 1960 and 1991 for blacks, leading to huge levels of shack living with Winterveld in Pretoria housing 500,000 former farmers by the 1980s. This reveals how attempts by the NP to control urban migration were spiralling out of control and threatening the Afrikaner way of life, undermining their power. Furthermore, African trade unions were beginning to wield significant power. The transport union, PUTCO, struck in 1972 and a 1973 strike in Durban among black workers was the catalyst

far over 50 further groups of workers to strike. This highlights how the workforce was increasingly organised and had the power to severely disrupt the economy of SA, a major challenge to the NP's power. Finally, NP power was further undermined by the growing militancy of students in townships, particularly Soweto. Soweto was becoming increasingly politicised and violent with the ideas of black consciousness spreading and influencing the 1976 Soweto Uprising which undermined the black councils the NP set up. Groups like the Dirty Dozen added to the lawlessness. This illuminates how African urban areas were increasingly uncontrollable and motivated by the politics of liberation, seriously undermining the power of the NP over them. Therefore, in the years 1968-83, the power of the NP was seriously undermined because of domestic challenges.

However, it is also accurate to say that NP power was not seriously undermined in these years because of the increasing power that Botha held. Botha, known as Die Groot Krokodil, was determined to take back control and by 1980, had set up an Executive Council and made himself President. This reveals how power was increasingly concentrated in the executive, allowing the NP even greater power over the direction of the country. Furthermore, power was not undermined because of the increasing power that the NP had to deal with dissidents. Vorster had introduced measures in 1967, allowing suspects to be detained indefinitely without trial. This reveals how NP governments of 1968-83 could operate an increasingly intolerant approach to political

protestors such as Steve Biko who they murdered in ~~1977~~ 1977. This shows NP power was actually enhanced in this period to stamp out opposition. Finally, Vorster and Botha's successes in the homelands further tightened their grip on power. They were able to appoint sympathetic chiefs like Kaiser Matanzima in Transkei whose Public Safety Act gave him almost unlimited powers to control opposition in this homeland and the huge levels of funding further entrenched homelands. This highlights how the NP had success in using the homelands as a vehicle for controlling Africans and asserting their apartheid model, increasing their power. Therefore, in the years 1968-83, NP power was not seriously undermined because of Vorster's and Botha's tightened grip on power and greater control.

Finally, it is <sup>quite</sup> ~~very~~ inaccurate to say that in the years 1968-83, NP power was seriously undermined because of the lack of severity of challenges. For instance the information scandal of 1978 revealed that Mulder's slush fund to be managed by Esdell Rhodes was being used in a corrupt way but it failed to have an impact and the NP returned a comfortable majority in the 1981 elections. This illuminates the lack of effect that NP was doing had on the white public and thus how it failed to undermine power. Plus, the SADC also failed to have an impact as most of the transport links and infrastructure in the region were controlled by SA. This reveals how the NP was able to retain their dominance in southern Africa as many countries remained economically reliant on them, especially

the sympathetic bastions Banda in Malawi and small countries like Lesotho and Swaziland, again failing to undermine NP power. Finally, this period still saw steady economic success with Western powers still seeing SA as a Cold War ally and supporting constructive engagement whereby big companies like VW and Coca Cola were still set up, revealing the failure of the west to economically isolate SA and thus reduce NP power. Therefore, NP power was not significantly undermined because of the lack of severity of challenges.

To conclude, despite the fact that international pressures and increasing domestic challenges and violence went some way to undermining NP power, it is clear that from 1968-83, their power was not severely undermined as they quickly recovered from a number of political, social and economic problems and the combination of Vorster and Botha ensured the NP held their grip on power, increasing their powers over dissidence and keeping Afrikaners aside.



**ResultsPlus**  
Examiners Comments

This is a secure level 5 response. It contains sustained analysis that is linked to the focus of the question throughout. This analysis is supported by precise and specific evidence that draws widely on relevant material from the period of the question.

## Paper Summary

Based on their performance on this paper, candidates are offered the following advice:

### Section A

- Candidates should read the question carefully and ensure that they directly address the focus of the enquiry in their comments throughout the answer
- Candidates should aim to draw out reasoned and developed inferences that go beyond comprehension and summary of the sources
- Candidates should read the caption carefully so that they can make full use of it when evaluating the sources
- Contextual knowledge should be used to illuminate and discuss what is in the source, rather than provide an answer to the enquiry. Long descriptions of linked events are unlikely to gain much, if any, credit
- Candidates should ensure that their responses address the demands of all elements of the mark scheme.

### Section B

- Candidates must provide precise contextual knowledge as evidence. Weaker responses generally lacked depth and sometimes range
- Candidates should avoid a narrative/descriptive approach; this undermines the analysis that is required for the higher levels
- Candidates need to be aware of key dates as identified in the specification so that they can address the questions with chronological precision
- Candidates should try to explore the links between issues rather than merely present a list of factors
- Candidates should ensure that they deal with both sides of an argument where the question requires this.

## **Grade boundaries**

Grade boundaries for this, and all other papers, can be found on the website on this link:

<https://qualifications.pearson.com/en/support/support-topics/results-certification/grade-boundaries.html>

